Greetings Court fans!
Two unanimous opinions today, both from the February sitting. In both cases, the Court rejected rules that would have required complicated balancing tests or detailed factual inquiries, opting instead for simple rules.
In the first opinion, Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt (02-42), the Court (per O’Connor) held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Nevada to give full faith and credit to a California statute providing its tax agency with immunity from suit. When California taxing authorities came after respondent for unpaid taxes, he filed suit against the tax agency in Nevada state court alleging that the agency had committed negligence and a host of intentional torts. (Respondent used to live in California, but had since moved to Nevada.) The tax agency litigated for a while in Nevada state court and then discovered that there was a California law that completely immunized it from suit. (Must have missed that memo. . .) When the agency finally raised this argument, the Nevada courts refused to give full effect to the law. The Nevada Supreme Court held that as a matter of comity, it would give effect to the California law to the extent that it did not contravene Nevada’s interests. Applying this rule, and in accordance with Nevada public policy, the Nevada Supreme Court allowed the California tax agency immunity for its negligence but not for its intentional torts.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause is relatively strict with respect to court judgments, the clause does not require a state to apply another state’s laws “dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.” In the face of this basic principle, the California tax agency asked the Court to adopt a new rule. Specifically, the tax agency asked the Court to interpret the Full Faith and Credit clause to require a state to give effect to a sister state’s statutory sovereign immunity when refusal to do so would interfere with the sister state’s capacity to fulfill its sovereign responsibilities. In other words, the agency wanted a rule that would require states to apply a sister state’s statutes when necessary to protect “core sovereignty” interests. Recognizing that this rule would require balancing state interests and the relative strength of sovereignty interests, the Court rejected the opportunity to adopt it, concluding with this line: “Without a rudder to steer us, we decline to embark on the constitutional course of balancing coordinate States’ competing sovereign interests to resolve conflicts of laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”
In the second case, Massaro v. United States (01-1559), Kennedy wrote for the Court to hold that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be brought in a habeas proceeding, whether or not the petitioner could have brought the claim on direct appeal. In this case, Massaro filed a habeas petition arguing that his original trial counsel was ineffective. The Second Circuit held that he had procedurally defaulted this claim because he could have raised the argument on direct appeal. (Under the complicated rules of habeas, claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised in habeas proceedings without showing cause and prejudice for the procedural default.) This holding was in line with Second Circuit precedent that held that a defendant must raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims when the defendant (1) is represented by new counsel on appeal, and (2) trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is evident from the record. The Seventh Circuit had adopted a similar (although somewhat more fact-intensive and complicated) rule — generating a concurrence from Judge Easterbrook who criticized the rule as unnecessarily complicated — but 10 other federal appellate courts had held that there is no procedural default for failure to raise an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.
Today, the Court joined with the majority of the lower courts and overturned the Second and Seventh Circuit’s rule. (In the course of the opinion, Kennedy refers to Easterbrook by name and quotes his concurrence several times. From what little I know of Easterbrook, I am certain that this opinion is being devoured and relished in Chicago, especially since the author of the overly complicated rule that Easterbrook criticized was Judge Posner.) The Court noted that ineffective assistance claims are best raised in habeas proceedings, where there is an opportunity to develop a record and factual predicate for the claims. Trial records are generally, indeed usually, inadequate to determine whether counsel was deficient, and if so, whether the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Moreover, requiring defendants to bring ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal generates inefficiencies. Upon pain of waiver, appellate counsel will feel pressured to bring ineffective assistance claims (regardless of their merit) without the benefit of an adequate record. Under these circumstances, some meritorious claims might fail, and in any event, appellate courts will waste time addressing claims that are better handled in the first instance in a habeas proceeding with a full record. Finally, the Second Circuit’s rule requires habeas courts to determine whether appellate counsel was “new” and whether trial counsel’s ineffectiveness was evident from the record. In light of these inefficiencies, the Court concluded that the better rule was the one adopted by the majority of the appellate courts: although ineffective assistance claims may be raised on direct appeal, they may also be raised for the first time in a habeas proceeding.
That’s all for the week. The Court sits again Monday for its last week of arguments for the Term. Thanks for reading!
Sandy
From the Appellate Practice Group at Wiggin & Dana.
For more information, contact Mark Kravitz, Jeff Babbin, or Sandy Glover
at 203-498-4400, or visit our website at www.wiggin.com.