Greetings Court fans!
A lot of news today, as will probably be the case for the rest of the Term, so let’s get to it:
First, from the order list:
1. The Court granted cert in 3 cases:
a. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (02-1205): This is a case about the applicability of a “catchall” 4-year statute of limitations to causes of action arising under the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
b. Locke v. Davey (02-1315): This is a free exercise clause case with the following question presented: “Does the First Amendment’s free exercise clause require a state to fund religious instruction if it provides college scholarships for secular instruction?”
c. Missouri v. Seibert (02-1371): Under the rule of Oregon v. Elstad, a suspect who has responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given Miranda warnings. In this case, the Court will consider whether this rule holds when the initial failure to give Miranda warnings was intentional.
2. The Court denied cert in quite a few cases, including one of particular interest to those interested in personal jurisdiction issues arising from actions in cyberspace. In Young v. New Haven Advocate (02-1394), the Fourth Circuit held that a Connecticut newspaper’s posting of allegedly defamatory news articles on its website does not subject the paper to personal jurisdiction in Virginia because the newspaper did not demonstrate an intent to aim its website or posted articles at a Virginia audience. The Supreme Court denied cert, and thus the Fourth Circuit’s decision stands. Congrats to counsel for the newspapers (an update reader)!
3. Finally, late last week, the Court issued it’s first official ruling in the campaign finance case, denying the motions to dispense with printing of the district court’s opinions. (Remember, this is the case with ~1700 pages of district court opinion…) As you may or may not know, several parties have already filed jurisdictional statements with the Supreme Court, but the Court has not issued any orders officially granting review in the case. (Supreme Court review is all but certain, but the timing of that review is another matter.) In other news on this case, most (if not all) of the parties had asked the district court to stay some or all of its decision pending review by the Supreme Court. Today, the district court issued an order that stayed its final judgment in the case, thus leaving the campaign finance law, as enacted, in effect until further review by the Supreme Court.
Ok, on to the opinions. The Court issued four opinions from argued cases, and one opinion summarily reversing the Ninth Circuit.
First, in Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians (02-281), the Court (Ginsburg for everyone but Stevens) held that a Native American Tribe is not a “person” who may sue under 42 USC 1983. There’s not much to say about this opinion past its holding, so I’ll keep it brief. The Tribe here didn’t want local law enforcement officials to execute search warrants on its reservation, so it sued those officials under Section 1983, which allows “persons” to seek legal and equitable relief from persons who, under color of state law, deprive them of federally protected rights. The question is thus whether the Tribe (a sovereign) is a person who can bring suit under the statute. The Court noted that whether a sovereign qualifies as a “person” who may maintain a particular claim for relief depends on an analysis of the “legislative environment” in which the word “person” appears. Here, the legislative environment dooms the Tribe: Section 1983 was designed to protect private rights against government encroachment, not to protect a sovereign’s prerogative to withhold evidence in a criminal investigation. Stevens concurred in the judgment. He believes that a Tribe is a person entitled to sue under Section 1983, but that the Tribe had failed to state a cause of action under that statute.
Next, in Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard (02-337), a unanimous Court (opinion by Souter) held that actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act in state court may be removed to federal court. (Again, not much to say here beyond the holding, so let me see if I can find something interesting…) The general federal removal statute states that except as “expressly provided,” any case brought in state court that could have been brought in federal court as an original matter may be removed to federal court. Some courts had interpreted language in the FLSA — language providing that suits to enforce its provisions “may be maintained . . . in any Federal or State court” — as an express prohibition on removal, but today the Supreme Court rejected that interpretation. As Souter noted, the term “maintain” is (at best) ambiguous, and if an ambiguous term qualifies as an “express” provision prohibiting removal, then “express” has no meaning at all. This conclusion is underscored by other statutes that contain “indisputable prohibitions” on removal. In addition, if “maintain” is read to preclude removal, it would preclude removal in several other statutes, and the Court was just not willing to go that far.
Third, in Price v. Vincent (02-524), the Court (under the Chief’s pen) issued its first decision from the April sitting. The basic theme in this case is that the Sixth Circuit failed to properly apply the deferential standard of review for habeas cases. (By my count, this is the fourth decision this Term reversing a court of appeals for failing to properly apply the deferential habeas standard. Of course, the first three decisions reversed the Ninth Circuit, but the theme is still there: Don’t mess with state court decisions upholding criminal convictions!) During Vincent’s murder trial, on his counsel’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, the judge made comments suggesting that he believed the state had failed to prove essential elements of first degree murder and thus that the only question was whether Vincent was guilty of second degree murder. Despite these comments, the judge permitted the jury to consider a first-degree murder charge, and lo-and-behold, he was convicted on that charge. Vincent argued that this violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, but the Michigan Supreme Court rejected that argument. Later, a federal district court granted Vincent’s habeas petition on the Double Jeopardy issue, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
As relevant here, Section 2254(d) provides that a state prisoner is not entitled to habeas relief unless the state court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. Instead of applying this standard in this case, the Sixth Circuit essentially reviewed Vincent’s argument de novo, and thus failed to give proper deference to the state court decision. Review of the state court’s decision through the lens of 2254(d), however, demonstrates that Vincent was not entitled to habeas relief. Here, the decision was not contrary to applicable law and was not an unreasonable application of that law. The Michigan Supreme Court cited and applied governing Supreme Court precedent. Thus, even if the U.S. Supreme Court might have come to a different conclusion if reviewing the issue de novo, it was at least reasonable for the state court to conclude otherwise. Vincent was not entitled to habeas relief.
Fourth, and last of the opinions from argued cases today, was Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh (01-188), a case that upheld (at least temporarily) Maine’s attempt to reduce prescription drug costs for its residents. Under Maine’s program, the state tries to negotiate with drug companies for rebates on drug purchases. If a drug company refuses to enter into a rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales of the drug will be subject to a “prior authorization” requirement. Petitioner challenged the statute, claiming it was pre-empted by the Medicaid statute and that it violated the negative commerce clause. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against implementation of the statute, but the First Circuit reversed. The question before the Court was whether the district court properly granted the preliminary injunction; in a splintered opinion, the Court said “no.”
In portions of the opinion joined by everyone but Scalia and Thomas, the Court (opinion by Stevens) held that petitioner had failed to meet its burden of showing a probability of success on its Commerce Clause arguments. The statute does not regulate prices of out-of-state transactions and does not discriminate against interstate commerce to subsidize in-state retail sales. On this issue, both Scalia and Thomas (in separate opinions) emphasize their view that the “negative Commerce Clause” has no basis in the Constitution.
The question of Medicaid pre-emption is a bit more complicated. In 4 separate opinions, 6 of the Justices held that the district court should have denied a preliminary injunction on this issue. Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg found that the district court should have denied the preliminary injunction request because petitioner had not shown that the Medicaid Act pre-empts Maine’s program. Petitioner claimed that the potential interference with Medicaid benefits (i.e., the prior authorization requirement) without serving any Medicaid purpose is prohibited by the Medicaid Act. But according to Stevens, et al., the Maine program may serve Medicaid purposes because it would provide benefits to needy people and curtail state Medicaid costs. These purposes would not save the program if it severely curtailed prescription drug access for Medicaid beneficiaries, but the district court erred by assuming that even a modest impediment to drug access would invalidate the program. Breyer agreed that petitioner was not entitled to a preliminary injunction simply by showing minimal or modest harm to the Medicaid program. (Breyer really wrote, it seems, to encourage the district court to refer the case to HHS under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.) Scalia wrote separately. He would reject the Medicaid pre-emption claim because, under the Medicaid Act, the remedy for a state’s failure to comply with Medicaid obligations is termination of funding by HHS. Petitioner could seek enforcement under the statute, and then seek relief in the courts if HHS’ enforcement decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Finally, Thomas wrote because he believes the plurality over-simplified the Medicaid statute. That statute is a delicate balance of competing interests (i.e., providing care, controlling costs of care), and it grants states great discretion in balancing those interests. In light of this broad discretion and of the competing interests at work in the statute, petitioner cannot demonstrate a credible conflict between the Maine program and the Medicaid act.
O’Connor (joined by the Chief and Kennedy) dissented on this issue, primarily on procedural grounds. According to O’Connor, et al., the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining implementation of Maine’s program. O’Connor agreed that the program is pre-empted if it does not serve a Medicaid goal, but unlike the plurality, found that on the record before the district court, there was no evidence that the program served such a purpose. In fact, Maine did not even attempt to identify any Medicaid purposes before the district court. On this record, O’Connor had no problem finding that petitioner had met its burden of showing that there was no Medicaid purpose for the program.
Finally, I close with my favorite decision of the day, City of Los Angeles v. David (02-1212), the summary reversal of the Ninth Circuit. Mr. David’s car was towed by the City, and he had to pay $134.50 to get it back. (That is not a typo. This case arose out of David’s angst over $134.50, not a small sum, but a somewhat reasonable charge when compared to tow charges in other big cities.) Ok, so what’s the federal issue here, you ask? Fair question. Well, David was mad because it took the city 27 days to grant him a hearing on whether his car was illegally parked, and so he claimed that this delay in deciding his entitlement to the $134.50 violated due process. The Ninth Circuit agreed, but the Court reversed, applying that old due process standby, Mathews v. Eldridge. Under that case, a court should decide what “process is due” by looking at the private interest affected by the official action, the likelihood that additional procedures would provide more accurate results, and the government’s interest in avoiding the burdens of additional procedures. As you might guess, the city’s administrative interest in towing lots of cars without crushing the police department with the costs associated with providing immediate hearings more than justifies a 30-day delay in deciding whether David was entitled to $134.50. Ergo, no due process violation. Summary reversal.
That’s all for today. Like most of the rest of the country, the Court will be out next Monday for Memorial Day, but will sit on Tuesday to hand down opinions and an order list. Until then, thanks for reading.
Sandy
From the Appellate Practice Group at Wiggin & Dana.
For more information, contact Mark Kravitz, Jeff Babbin, or Sandy Glover
at 203-498-4400, or visit our website at www.wiggin.com.