Two opinions today, but first, as promised, more information on two cases that were granted on Monday:
Hillside Dairy v. Lyons (01-950) and Ponderosa Dairy v. Lyons (01-1018): These cases, as suggested by the title, relate to milk. The questions presented are (1) Does Section 144 of the 1996 Farm Bill create a “blanket” exemption to the dormant commerce clause for California’s interstate regulation of dairy industry? (2) Is it proper for courts to resort to legislative history or paraphrase of statute in order to discern “unmistakably clear” congressional exemption to negative commerce clause? (3) Whether judicial review of the discriminatory effect under the privileges and immunities clause is foreclosed as a matter of law when the state discrimination is facially based on the out-of-state location of the farm, but the statute does not expressly relate to “out-of-state” residency.
American Insurance Association v. Low (02-722): (1) Whether California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act violates the foreign affairs doctrine of Zschernig v. Miller; (2) Whether the act violates the due process clause by regulating overseas insurance transactions from 1920 to 1945, and (3) Whether the McCarran Ferguson Act insulates the act from review under the foreign commerce clause.
Ok, on to the highlights from the opinions:
First, in Sattazhan v. Pennsylvania (01-7574), the Court rejected a Double Jeopardy challenge in a capital case. Sattazhan was convicted of first degree murder, but the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on the penalty. Because Pennsylvania law requires a unanimous verdict for the death penalty, this resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Sattazhan’s conviction was overturned, and Pennsylvania retried him for first-degree murder. In the new trial, Sattazhan was convicted again, but this time the jury voted unanimously for the death penalty.
Justice Scalia (joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas) held that the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Due Process Clause did not prevent the state from seeking the death penalty in the second trial. The Court described the general principles governing the double jeopardy analysis, but also noted that it had established special rules for capital sentencing proceedings. Specifically, in Bullington v. Missouri, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause applies to capital sentencing proceedings where those proceedings have the hallmarks of a trial on guilt or innocence. In that case, the Court held that when the capital sentencing procedure requires the jury to determine whether the state has proved its case for the death penalty, a sentence of life imprisonment signifies that the jury has acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary for the death penalty and thus the double jeopardy clause bars a state from seeking the death penalty on retrial. Scalia emphasized that in this case, as in other cases refining the Bullington decision, the central question is not whether the defendant received a life sentence during the first trial, but rather whether the decision in the first trial was effectively an “acquittal” on the death penalty issue. Applying this question to the facts of Sattazhan’s case, the Court held that there was no double jeopardy in a re-trial on the death penalty issue because the “hung” jury was not an effective acquittal on whether the state had proved facts sufficient to impose the death penalty. By failing to reach a unanimous verdict, the jury had effectively issued no decision on this issue.
Scalia also rejected Sattazhan’s due process challenge to his retrial on the death penalty. Scalia interpreted the due process claim as “nothing more than [the] double-jeopardy claim in different clothing” and thus declined to find more protection in the due process clause than was available through the double jeopardy clause.
In a separate part of the opinion (joined only by Rehnquist and Thomas), Scalia held that the double jeopardy conclusion was also supported by the Court’s recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey. O’Connor concurred specifically to indicate that she did not join this part of the opinion because she still disagrees with Apprendi.
Justice Ginsburg (joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) dissented. According to Ginsburg, once the court entered a final judgment of a life sentence — as required by state law when the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the sentencing question — double jeopardy barred the state from seeking the death penalty again. Ginsburg reviewed the double jeopardy jurisprudence and did not find the same requirement for an “acquittal” to trigger the double jeopardy clause. She found, instead, that defendants have a double jeopardy interest in avoiding multiple prosecutions even when there has been no determination of guilt or innocence. Her conclusion was supported in part by the choice that the Court’s decision forces on defendants who have been convicted to life after a jury deadlock: relinquish the right to a potentially meritorious appeal or the right to the life sentence imposed in the first trial.
In the second decision, Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen (01-1229), Justice Thomas (for a unanimous Court) rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to 23 U.S.C. 409, which protects information “compiled or collected” in connection with certain federal highway safety programs from being discovered or admitted in evidence in federal or state trials. The federal government has adopted several programs to help states identify highways in need of safety improvements. Under one such program, called the “section 152” program, the states must conduct a systematic survey of hazardous roads and intersections. Under pressure from states that feared that this data collection effort would increase the risk of liability for accidents that took place at hazardous intersections before improvements could be made, the federal government adopted 23 U.S.C. 409. This section, after further amendment, protects any information “compiled or collected” for the section 152 program from being discovered or admitted into state or federal trials.
Three weeks after Respondent’s wife died in an accident, Pierce County received section 152 funding to improve the intersection where she died. When Pierce County refused to turn over documents related to the 152 funding request for that intersection, Respondent sued in state court claiming that the refusal to release the documents violated the state public disclosure act (PDA). The trial court ordered the County to turn over the documents. At around the same time, Respondent filed a tort action against the County alleging that it had been negligent in failing to install proper traffic controls at the intersection. Respondent obtained an order to compel the County to produce the requested documents in discovery. Both cases were appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, and ultimately (as consolidated cases) to the Washington Supreme Court.
After reviewing this procedural history, Thomas began his opinion by dismissing cert in the tort case. According to the opinion, the decision on review in the tort case was only a discovery ruling and not a final decision. Therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the decision.
On the merits, the Court first construed the scope of Section 409. (This part is not so interesting.) At the end of the day, the Court adopted the Solicitor General’s interpretation of the statute: the section protects all information actually compiled or collected for section 152 purposes, but does not protect information originally compiled or collected for other purposes and that is currently held by the agencies that compiled or collected it, even if the information was at some point collected by another agency for 152 purposes. For those of us who had a hard time following this description, the Court provided a handy example: an accident report collected for law enforcement purposes by the county sheriff and held by sheriff would not be protected by section 409, even though the same report would be protected in the hands of the Public Works Department if it collected the report for 152 purposes.
Finally, the Court reached the Commerce Clause issue, and in a little over a page, rejected any suggestion that Section 409 violates the Commerce Clause. Section 409 is legislation aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protection for the instrumentalities of commerce. As such, it falls within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.