One new decision today, but first, for those of you handicapping the odds for retirements from the Court his year, note that the Chief did not participate in argument yesterday. (I couldn’t find out whether he participated today.) Stevens announced from the bench that the Chief was absent because he was still recuperating from his knee surgery last week. The Chief will participate in deciding the cases argued yesterday by reading the argument transcript and briefs.
On to the decision. Today, JPS announced the decision for a unanimous Court in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine (01-706), a case involving the preemptive scope of the Federal Boat Safety Act. (Stevens’ recent flurry of output dispels any suggestion that the 82-year old Justice might be slowing down, doesn’t it?). While the details of this case might not be especially relevant to your everyday life unless you’ve recently been injured in a boating accident, for those of you who deal with federal preemption issues, this is the case for you. (Happily, just today, I was working on a brief that involves a federal preemption issue. Thanks for the new cite JPS!)
Mrs. Sprietsma died in a boating accident, and her estate sued the manufacturer of the boat motor, in Illinois state court, seeking damages under Illinois common law. The estate’s basic theory was simple: the motor was unreasonably dangerous because it was not protected by a propeller guard. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Federal Boat Safety Act (FBSA) impliedly preempted Sprietsma’s common law claims, but the Supreme Court reversed, rejecting three different preemption theories. First, the Court held that the FBSA does not expressly preempt common law claims. The FBSA authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to issue safety regulations for boats, and provides in Section 10, that a state may not establish or enforce “a law or regulation” establishing a boat safety standard unless it is identical to any federal regulation on the topic. The FBSA also contains a savings clause, providing that compliance with the standards of the act “does not relieve a person from liability at common law.” According to the Court, the language in section 10 preempting “law[s] or regulation[s]” does not cover the common law. The use of the article “a” before “law or regulation” suggests a “discreteness” that is absent in the common law, and moreover the use of the words “law” and “regulation” together suggests an intent to preempt only positive enactments. After all, if “law” were broadly interpreted to include “common law” then it should probably also include “regulations,” but then the word “regulation” in the preemption clause would be superfluous. The Act’s savings clause supports this conclusion because it reflects an assumption by Congress that there were common law cases to save. Moreover, the general language in the savings clause about “liability at common law” contrasts with the specific language in the preemption clause indicating that the preemption clause only applies to requirements imposed by statute or regulation.
Second, the Court rejected the argument that the Coast Guard’s 1990 decision not to adopt a regulation requiring propeller guards impliedly preempted any state requirement of propeller guards. (The Coast Guard is the DOT agency authorized to adopt regulations under the act. Note to Congress: You’ll need to fix this when the Coast Guard moves to Homeland Security.) In 1990, the Coast Guard considered and rejected a proposal to adopt a regulation requiring propeller guards on boats, and the Illinois Supreme Court held that this amounted to a ruling that propeller guards should not be required as a matter of federal law. While the Court acknowledged that under certain circumstances, a federal decision to forgo regulation can be interpreted as a determination that regulation is inappropriate, that was not so in this case. Relying heavily on the Coast Guard’s reasoning when it rejected the proposed regulation, and on the Solicitor General’s representations of the Coast Guard’s position in the case before it, the Court concluded that the 1990 decision was not a federal decision that should preempt all state regulation. While the Coast Guard rejected the particular regulation in 1990, it did not decide, as a matter of federal law, that states should not impose propeller guard regulations. In other words, it did not reflect a federal policy against propeller guards, and thus did not impliedly preempt state regulations requiring propeller guards.
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the FBSA impliedly preempted the whole field of boat safety regulation. The Court examined the text, legislative history, and purposes of the statute, and found no intent by Congress to preempt all common law claims relating to boating standards.