Despite my earlier representation (“that’s all for today”), in fact, the Court issued two opinions today.
Before I get to the opinions, please note that in the race to issue the first majority opinion (and there is a race), O’Connor won. (I’m not biased or anything.) The summary reversals from yesterday don’t count. And even though the Chief also issued an opinion today, and even though the Court listed the Chief’s opinion first on its website, O’Connor wins because the Court announces its opinions by order of seniority, with the most senior Justice announcing last. Even more impressive for O’Connor was that she won the race by issuing an opinion (less than one month after argument!) on an amazingly technical and obscure issue. Some might even describe the issue as “boring.” I’ll let you decide.
In Yellow Transportation v. Michigan, (01-270), the Court (SO’C for everyone but Stevens) upheld, under Chevron, the Interstate Commerce Commission’s interpretation of a provision of a statute it administers. (If you don’t want to read any further, take away from this case that the Court has once again reaffirmed the Chevron framework.) Under prior law, states could require interstate motor carriers to register with the state and could charge a small registration fee. In implementing this regime, many states established reciprocal agreements with other states, under which they would discount or waive the registration fees for carriers from another state in exchange for reciprocal treatment from the other state. In 1991, Congress revised the system to implement a “single state registration system,” which, true to its name, would require motor carriers to register with only state. As part of this system, Congress capped the registration fees that could be charged at a fee that is “equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991.” In implementing regulations, the ICC concluded that states must consider fees charged under reciprocity agreements when determining the fees charged on November 15, 1991. In the case before the Court, as of Nov. 15, 1991, Michigan had a reciprocity agreement with Illinois pursuant to which it would not collect fees for petitioner’s Illinois-registered vehicles. Beginning in 1992, however, it decided to collect fees for petitioner’s vehicles based on the fact that petitioner was headquartered in Kentucky — a state with which it had no reciprocity agreement. The upshot of this change in policy was that if the ICC’s regulation was valid, Michigan could not charge a fee for the registration because it would exceed the fee that Michigan charged on Nov. 15, 1991 (i.e., under the reciprocity agreement with Illinois, nothing).
The Court upheld the regulation, expressly relying on the familiar Chevron framework. The Court began by noting that Congress expressly delegated authority to the ICC to implement the new statutory registration and fee provision, and that the ICC had done so pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking. The Court concluded that the statute did not foreclose the ICC’s interpretation, and then rejected several of the state’s arguments based on the language or purposes of the statute. Ultimately, the Court held that “because the ICC’s interpretation of [the fee cap] provision is consistent with the language of the statute and reasonably resolves any ambiguity therein,” the lower court erred by declining to enforce it.
Stevens concurred in the judgment. He understood Michigan’s new system to be consistent with the ICC regulation with respect to individual carriers because it charged the same fee both before and after Nov. 15, 1991, assessed the fee on the same vehicles before and after that date, and had reciprocal arrangements with the same states. According to Stevens, Michigan ran afoul of the law when it changed its method of determining the home state of out-of-state vehicles (from state of registration to state of headquarters). As Stevens read the statute, it gave the ICC power to prevent states from manipulating their fee systems (as did Michigan) to significantly increase their revenues and therefore threaten to burden interstate commerce. Therefore, Stevens would have upheld the ICC’s regulation “freezing” reciprocity agreements as a permissible exercise of its broad authority to create a system that does not burden interstate commerce.
Coming in second, the Chief wrote for a unanimous Court in Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, (01-757), in holding that the All Writs Act cannot support removal jurisdiction. In this case, Henson sued Syngenta in Louisiana state court asserting various tort claims. Henson’s state court action was later stayed when Henson successfully intervened in a similar action against Syngenta then pending in the Southern District of Alabama. When the Alabama action settled, it included a stipulation that all claims in the Louisiana action should be dismissed. Henson, however, continued to pursue his Louisiana action, and Syngenta removed the case to federal court, asserting federal jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, and the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. 1367. After the newly-removed case was transferred to the Southern District of Alabama, that court dismissed the action as contrary to the settlement. The Eleventh Circuit vacated this order of dismissal, however, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court first rejected the argument that because the All Writs Act authorizes a court to issue orders to prevent the frustration of its orders, and because the state court action undermined the earlier settlement, the All Writs Act authorized removal. According to the Court, the All Writs Act only comes into play in the absence of a statute that specifically addresses the issue, and in this case, removal is governed by specific federal statutes. Parties may not avoid complying with the removal statutes by resorting to the All Writs Act. Moreover, removal would have been improper under 28 U.S.C. 1441 because that statute limits removal to actions that could have been filed in federal court in the first instance and the All Writs Act does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts. The Court concluded by rejecting the suggestion that removal was proper under the ancillary jurisdiction statute because the Southern District of Alabama retained jurisdiction over the settlement. According to the Court, the fact that the court retained jurisdiction over one action does not authorize removal of a separate action.
Stevens concurred separately to indicate that he would expressly overrule the primary case relied upon by the petitioners in this case, United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), a case that Stevens believes misconstrued the All Writs Act.
Sandy
From the Appellate Practice Group at Wiggin & Dana.
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